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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
lead the way for expanded international use of the continental
shelf. Such an amendment should be constructed to meet the
test of maximum utilization of presently available uses and
those to come with a minimum of friction between states. In
keeping with present practice, the Secretary of the Interior
should continue to be authorized to grant leases for oil, gas and
sulfur production on the basis of competitive bidding. The
enumeration of additional uses and the methods for administer-
ing them would be unwise as it is impossible to foresee all the
projects which will be proposed for the shelf area, and such a
list would unnecessarily limit the scope of the amendment. The
Secretary should be authorized to grant permits for any reason-
able uses which are within the national interest, but only after
the developer has submitted his plans, public notice of the pro-
posal has been made, and a public hearing has been held to
consider the project and hear objections to it. In deciding what
is reasonable and within the national interest, the Secretary
should consider each of the following: net economic return to
society, effect on the environment, proximity to and possible
interference with other uses, effect on foreign relations, effect
on national defense, and the financial responsibility of the pro-
moter.
Such an amendment would make mandatory a clarification
of the nature of the coastal states' rights under the Convention.
That revision should itself make clear that the coastal states
may make any reasonable use of the shelf with the stipulation
that limitations in the Convention must be strictly adhered to.
Jean Talley Drew
THE RIGHT TO RESIST AN UNLAWFUL ARREST
Louisiana, like most of the states in this country, recognizes
the right to resist an unlawful arrest.1 The Louisiana rule is
codified in both the Louisiana Criminal Code and the Louisiana
be possible by amending the OCSLA. See also Z. SLOUKA, INTERNATIONAL
CUSTOM AND THE CONTINENTAL SHELF (1968).
1. City of Monroe v. Ducas, 203 La. 971, 979, 14 So.2d 781, 784 (1943).
"The right of personal liberty is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed
to every citizen, and any unlawful interference with it may be resisted. Every
person has a right to resist an unlawful arrest; and, in preventing such
illegal restraint of his liberty, he may use such force as may be necessary."
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Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 108 of the Criminal Code2
makes a crime the resistance to an individual "acting in his official
capacity and authorized by law to make a lawful arrest," and
article 220 of the Code of Criminal Procedure3 requires that a
"person . . . submit peaceably to a lawful arrest." (Emphasis
added.) Recently, however, the right to resist an unlawful ar-
rest has been challenged. Section 5 of the Uniform Arrest Act 4
abrogates the right to use "force or any weapon in resisting arrest
regardless of whether there is a legal basis for the arrest."
Section 3.04 (2) (a) (i) of the Model Penal Code adopted by
the American Law Institute in 1958, denies the right to resist
an arrest which the person being arrested "knows is being made
by a peace officer, although the arrest is unlawful." This Com-
ment has a dual scope: first, to discuss the policy arguments
for both the general rule and the modern changes; and secondly,
to examine the constitutional questions raised by any attempt
to change the rule.
Policy Aspects of the Old and New Rules
Proponents of a change in the Anglo-American rule empha-
size that the right to resist an unlawful arrest came into exist-
ence many hundreds of years ago when the administration of
criminal justice itself required such a rule to relieve the inhuman
and oppressive procedures and conditions then operative. At
that time bail was generally unattainable, and a speedy trial
was the exception rather than the rule. The conditions in English
jails were "such that a prisoner had an excellent chance of dying
of disease before trial."03 Since these extreme conditions are
generally nonexistent today, insofar as the possibility of great
physical dangers resulting from incarceration are concerned, it
is argued that there is no longer a need for the right to resist
an unlawful arrest. Moreover, with increased violent activity in
the cities, those in favor of abolishing the right can call upon
one of this country's most distinguished jurists, Judge Learned
Hand, who said:
2. LA. R.S. 14:108 (1950).
3. LA. Coos CmuM. P. art. 220.
4. UNIFORM ARREST ACT § 5. New Hampshire, Delaware, and Rhode
Island have adopted this Act either verbatim or in all its essential aspects.
See N.H. Rev. Stats. ch. 594; Del. Code, Tit. 11, §§ 1901-32; and R. I. Gen.
Laws Tit. 12, ch. 7.
5. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2) (a) (i) (proposed official draft, 1962).
6. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. Rsv. 315 (1942).
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"The idea that you may resist peaceful arrest ... because
you are in debate about whether it is lawful or not, instead
of going to the authorities ... seems to me not a blow for
liberty but, on the contrary, a blow for attempted anarchy."7
Another basic argument of those who would abrogate the
right is as follows: violent demonstrations and mob activities
are increasing at a rate equal to the decline of respect for the
police and police authority. The right of resistance, where rec-
ognized, turns on the lawfulness of the arrest-a complex issue
as evidenced by the fact that it is often decided by a court of
last resort. From these factors emerges a dual dilemma. First, a
policeman's work in the area of arrests, especially warrantless
arrests, calls for an endless series of on-the-spot evaluations and
decisions. The problems of the police need no further compound-
ing. Secondly, alternative remedies to resistance exist. People
should be encouraged to peacefully submit to all arrests and to
refer any grievances to a court.
Protection of the citizenry is also strongly urged as a reason
for abolishing the right. "In a day when police are armed with
lethal and chemical weapons, and possess scientific communica-
tion and detection devices readily available for use, it has become
highly unlikely that a suspect, using reasonable force, can . . .
deter arrest."s Generally, all that will be accomplished is tempo-
rary evasion which increases the likelihood that both the sub-
ject of the arrest and innocent bystanders will be injured in the
process of overcoming the resistance.
A final argument in favor of abolishing the right is the
limited scope of the proposed change. The provisions in the
model acts uniformily provide that there shall be no right to
forcibly resist an unlawful arrest by a peace officer who is
identified as such to the party arrested. Thereunder, neither
passive resistance nor citizen arrests are affected.
Although a significant array of reasons exist for abolish-
ing the right, there are numerous reasons for its retention. One
such reason is that the proposed change might possibly foster
conditions inherent in a police state. The new law could be an
instrument of oppression. Armed with such a statute a police-
7. ALI PRacsvDaos 254 (1958).
8. People v. Curtis, 70 Cal.2d 347, 353, 450 P.2d 33, 36, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713,
716 (1969).
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man, even for reasons of prejudice or whim, could attempt to
make a patently false and provocative arrest and thereby in-
furiate the average citizen into some form of resistance. There-
after, the citizen could be charged with resisting arrest, which
would be a crime regardless of the invalidity of the initial at-
tempted arrest. The argument that all the citizen need do is
refrain from resisting the arrest is disclaiming the realities of an
oppressive and repulsive situation. Of course, the aggrieved party
has two other remedies. First, he has an action in tort or an
action under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act for money
damages.' However, the tort remedy is generally in fact an
empty one. The policeman may be judgment proof because of
prior garnishments, crowded civil dockets, or a myriad of other
reasons. 10 Second, there is a possibility of the institution of a
criminal action against the offending officer for his unlawful
action. However, the district attorney's office must work hand-
in-hand with the police. Cooperation being inherent in the re-
lationship, it would seem that an aggravated case would be
necessary to stir a prosecutor to action."
In short, the arguments from a policy viewpoint endlessly tip
the scales of reason back and forth. But it is submitted that a
more detailed analysis of other arguments and remedies begs the
more pertinent question. If there is a constitutional right to be
secure in one's person against unreasonable searches and seizures,
it cannot be a crime to reasonably resist interference with that
right.
Constitutional Questions
A person is arrested when an officer, by means of physical
force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty
of a citizen.12 All arrests under authority of a warrant issued upon
probable cause are lawful. In our Anglo-American system of
law, in the absence of statute, a peace officer is usually autho-
rized to arrest without a warrant where he has reasonable cause
to believe that a felony has been or is being committed and that
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). For an excellent discussion, see Comment, 30
LA. L. Rsv. 100 (1969).
10. Wilson, Police Arrest Privileges in a Free Society: A Plea for
Modernization, 51 J. CmM. L.C. & P.S. 895, 399 (1960).
11. Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights,
39 MINN. L. RIv. 493 (1955).
12. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
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the person to be arrested is the one who committed it.18 As to
misdemeanors, the general rule for warrantless arrests is that
a peace officer can arrest only for those offenses committed in
his presence which involved a breach of the peace.14 This rule
is frequently changed by statute, however, to allow warrantless
arrests by a peace officer for any misdemeanor committed in his
presence.15 Louisiana's statutory provisions on arrest are found
in articles 201-232 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Article
202 provides for the issuance of arrest warrants by a magistrate,
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and de-
scribing the person to be arrested. Article 213 provides four situa-
tions in which a peace officer may make a warrantless arrest.18
State law alone, however, is not conclusive of the issue of
the validity of an arrest. The lawfulness of an arrest is deter-
mined by state law only insofar as the arrest is not otherwise
violative of the United States Constitution.17 The constitutional
validity of an arrest is dependent upon the existence of probable
cause at the time the arrest was made. Probable cause exists
"where the facts and circumstances within their [the officers']
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy in-
formation [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is
being committed."' 8
13. See generally 5 AM. JuR. 2d Arrests § 26 (1962).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 213. "A peace officer may, without a warrant,
arrest a person when:
(1) The person to be arrested has committed an offense in his presence,
and if the arrest is for a misdemeanor it must be made immediately or on
close pursuit;
(2) The person to be arrested has committed a felony, although not in
the presence of the officer;
(3) The peace officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person
to be arrested has committed an offense, although not in the presence of
the officer; or
(4) The peace officer has received positive and reliable Information that
another peace officer holds a warrant for the arrest."
It should be noted that article 933 defines "offense" to include both
felonies and misdemeanors, and therefore under article 213(3) a person
can be arrested in Louisiana for a misdemeanor upon reasonable cause
alone, with no "in presence" requirement, Article 213(2) allows for arrest
without a warrant for a felony, not committed in the presence of the ar-
resting officer, and with no requirement of probable cause. It Is submitted
that subsection 2 of article 213 is constitutionally inadequate.
17. Klinger v. United States, 409 F.2d 299, 302 (8th Cir. 1969), citing
as authority Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 305 (1958).
18. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949), as cited in Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23, 35 (1963). There has been much conjecture
COMMENTS
The United States Supreme Court has said in dictum that,
"one has an undoubted right to resist an unlawful arrest,"'19 but
unfortunately the court failed to reveal whether this statement
rested on constitutional or common law authority. In Wainwright
v. City of New Orleans,20 Mr. Chief Justice Warren fathered the
phrase, "a Fourth Amendment right to resist," although he ad-
mitted that the constitutional issue of the right to resist an un-
lawful arrest was unnecessary in deciding that case. The issue
of the existence of a Fourth Amendment right to reasonably
resist an unlawful arrest has never been squarely raised or
decided.
Any foray into the Fourth Amendment in search of a right
to resist an unlawful arrest must begin with the principles im-
plicit in the amendment itself. In Terry v. Ohio,21 the Supreme
Court said:
"The Fourth amendment provides that 'the right of the
people to be secure in their persons.., shall not be violated.'
This inestimable right of personal security belongs as much
to the citizen on the streets of our cities as to the home-
owner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs.
For, as this court has always recognized, 'no right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded... than the right
of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others .....
We have recently held that the Fourth amendment protects
people and not places, and wherever an individual may
harbor a reasonable expectation of privacy.., he is entitled
to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.122
Five years before Terry, the court made these pronounce-
ments on the Fourth Amendment in Ker v. California:
about what effect Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1. (1967) will have upon the probable
cause requirement. While holding that a stop and frisk was a search and
seizure and therefore subject to the Fourth Amendment, the court allowed
a temporary, investigatory seizure of a person upon a reasonableness
standard which, although objective, clearly amounted to less than the prob-
able cause required for a full blown arrest. However, the procedure delineated
in Terry is quite proscribed and does not allow arrests (as used in standard
jargon, implying a trip to the stationhouse and booking) on less than
probable cause and, therefore, should pose no problem to the areas covered
herein.
19. United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581, 594 (1948).
20. 392 U.S. 598 (1967).
21. 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
22. Id. at 8-9.
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"Implicit in the Fourth amendment's protection from un-
reasonable searches and seizures is its recognition of indi-
vidual freedom. That safeguard has been declared to be 'as
of the very essence of constitutional liberty .... The amend-
ment is to be liberally construed and all owe the duty of
viligence lest there shall be impairment of the rights for
the protection of which it was adopted.' "28
Armed with this background knowledge, imagine this hypo-
thetical case. A citizen following his daily routine is suddenly
approached by a policeman who informs him that he is under
arrest. The citizen is guilty neither of crime, or suspicious con-
duct: the officer has absolutely no probable cause to arrest him.
The citizen pushes off and runs away. Subsequently, the citizen
is arrested for both crime A (the one he was told he had com-
mitted) and for the crime of resisting arrest. At arraignment,
the district attorney drops the crime A charge but not the
resisting arrest charge. Although the citizen protests at the trial,
he learns that his legislature, following the uniform acts, has
made resisting even the most patently unlawful arrest a crime.
Under these facts there is obviously an infringement of a
zealously protected constitutional right. Although the citizen has
a remedy in civil damages, he is still subjected to a flagrant
invasion of his rights. The invasion becomes even more obnoxious
when the policeman, by his conduct in effecting the unlawful ar-
rest, intentionally provokes the citizen to resist. If such resistance
is a crime, it is within the legislative power to transform the
Fourth Amendment from the bedrock of individual freedom into
a mere mirage. If it is permissible to convict a citizen of reason-
able resistance to an unconstitutional intrusion upon a sacred
right, then there is in effect no right to be free from unreasonable
seizures and no real right to individual liberty.
Although there is no jurisprudence directly concerning a
constitutional right to resist an unlawful arrest, a simple ex-
planation exists. The rule allowing resistance is well established
in our Anglo-American jurisprudence, having been established
at English common law in 1666.24 Until recently all of the states
recognized the right; therefore, there was no occasion to rely
upon either the Fourth Amendment or due process of law.
23. 374 U.S. 23, 32-33 (1963).
24. Hopkin Huggett's Case, 84 Eng. Rep. 1082 (K.B. 1666).
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The Supreme Court has held that Fourth Amendment rights
are "to be ranked as fundamental," and, as such, binding on
the states through the due process clause of the Fourth Amend-
ment.25 The important point is that the right to resist an unlawful
arrest is not a right which is realized through lengthy constitu-
tional analysis and involved reasoning, but it is a right which is
of the essence of the liberty of the person guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment and by due process of law.
The right to be free from arbitrary government restraint is a
constitutional right which even the literal readers of the Con-
stitution recognize. The Supreme Court has often recounted the
reasons behind the Fourth Amendment.2 It was a product of the
memory of colonial Americans who had been subject to arbitrary
governmental restraint of their personal freedoms. One of those
most eloquent in the denouncement of such restraint was James
Otis, who condemned all governmental devices which "placed
the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer." 27
It is submitted that the same effect would result from abolishing
the right to resist an unlawful arrest. Although the citizen has
the simple solution of not resisting an unlawful arrest, this solu-
tion is contrary to all reality, as both American and English
courts have recognized:
"For most people, an illegal arrest is an outrageous affront
and intrusion-the more offensive because under color of
law-to be resisted as energetically as a violent assault. '28
The situation is aggravated by the fact that the legality of
the policeman's actions would not be at issue and would be no
defense under the proposed changes. In effect, the legislation gives
greater respect to the authority of the police than "to the right
of the people to be secure in their persons." The framers of the
Constitution realized that there were certain basic rights abso-
lutely necessary to a free society which could not be limited
even when a majority of the people felt that to do so would be
in the best interest of the state. History records their solution
25. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949).
26. E.g., Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
27. Id. at 364.
28. People v. Cherry, 307 N.Y. 308, 311, 121 N.E.2d 238, 240 (1954); lan-
guage to the same effect in The Queen v. Tooley, 92 Eng. Rep. 349, 352 (K.B.
1760) these citations found in Chevigny, The Right to Resist an Unlawfuz
Arrest, 78 YALE L. J. 1128, 1137 (1969).
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as the Bill of Rights. The rights encompassed, among them the
right of freedom from governmental restraint of one's person,
are not subject to any tampering-not to mention total abroga-
tion-by government in the name of public policy.
Other Fourth Amendment problems may arise if the right to
resist an unlawful arrest is abolished. When a person is unlawfully
arrested, all evidence taken in a search incident thereto, includ-
ing all statements made by the arrested party, are inadmissible
in any future criminal prosecutions. 29 All "fruits of the unlawful
action" are likewise tainted with the initial illegality and are
inadmissible.80 In Wong Sun v. United States,8 1 the Supreme
Court held that evidence "come at by the exploitation of an il-
legality" against T was inadmissible against Y. The illegality
against T in Wong Sun was an illegal arrest. If the product of
an illegal arrest is inadmissible against a third party in a later
prosecution, it is no less objectionable to use the product of the
illegality in a later prosecution of the very person who was the
subject of the original illegality. It is therefore submitted that
there can never be a successful prosecution, as far as the Fourth
Amendment is concerned, for resistance to an unlawful arrest
because such resistance is by definition a "fruit of the poisonous
tree."
Other constitutional objections may be raised. It has been
asserted that in some cases a prosecution for resisting an unlawful
arrest may be overturned because the police action in effecting
such an arrest would be tantamount to an entrapment. 2 Further-
more, grave constitutional questions would arise whenever the
arrested person was engaged in First Amendment activity at
the time of the illegal arrest.u It is well settled that laws leaving
too much discretion to enforcing officers will be invalidated if
such laws can be used to prohibit the exercise of First Amend-
ment rights. 84
29. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Henry v. United States,
361 U.S. 98 (1959).
30. See note 29 supra.
31. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
32. Chevigny, The Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest, 78 YALz L. J.
1128 (1969).
33. Id.
34. Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966); Shuttlesworth v. Birming-
ham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
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Future of the Right in Louisiana
The 1970 regular session of the Louisiana legislature did not
reach a vote on a bill which embodied a Louisiana Law In-
stitute proposal35 to amend articles 220 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure and 108 of the Criminal Code. The purpose of the
proposal was to abolish the right to resist an unlawful arrest
by adopting the provisions of the Model Codes. However, the
proposal went even further in that it made resisting an unlawful
arrest a new substantive crime. Presently the crime of resisting
an officer is composed of two elements: a lawful arrest, and
resistance thereto. The amendment would have deleted the first
element, making a crime of resistance alone.
In the discussion surrounding the Law Institute's proposal
the statement was made that article 220 if amended would re-
quire submission to any arrest by a known peace officer which
is the rule of the Illinois Code. This statement should be ques-
tioned. Although the Illinois Code embodies the model code
provision, the corresponding Illinois criminal statutes have not
been amended accordingly. The federal District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois recently considered the constitu-
tionality of the Illinois resisting arrest statute and said:
35. LA. R.S. 14:108 (1963).
Present statute: "Resisting an officer is the intentional opposition or resist-
ance to, or obstruction of, an individual acting in his official capacity
and authorized by law to make a lawful arrest or seizure of property,
or to serve any lawful process or court order, when the offender knows
or has reason to know that the person arresting, seizing property, or
serving process is acting in his official capacity.
The phrase 'obstruction of' as used herein shall in addition to its
common meaning, signification and connotation means:
(a) Flight by one sought to be arrested before the arresting officer
can restrain him and after notice is given that he is under arrest.(b) Any violence toward or any resistance or opposition to the
arresting officer after the party is actually placed under arrest and
before he is incarcerated.
(c) Refusal by the arrested party to give his name and make his
identity known to the arresting officer.
(d) Congregating with others on a public street and refusing to
move on when ordered to do so by the officer.
Whoever commits the crime of resisting an officer shall be fined
not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not more than
six months, or both."
Proposed change: "Resisting an officer is the intentional opposition or re-
sistance to, or obstruction of, a peace officer acting in his official capacity
in making an arrest, detaining an arrested person after arrest, seizing
property, or serving any process or order of court. When the officer is
identified or has identified himself as a peace officer, the opposition,
resistance, or obstruction shall be an offense regardless of whether or
not the arrest, detention, seizure of property, or service of process was
lawful." (No change in the remainder of the section).
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"It does not proscribe resisting or obstructing an unlawful
act of a peace officer. The guilt or innocence of the defendant
specfically depends on the validity of the officer's act.
Therefore, if a policeman erroneously, capriciously, or ar-
bitrarily orders peaceful demonstrators to disperse, acts of
resistance or obstruction by the demonstrators would not
subject them to criminal liability under this provision." e
(Emphasis added.)
When the model code provisions were adopted in California,
their supreme court remarked:
"... it is clear that . . . [the new provision] was meant at
most to eliminate the common law defense of resistance to
unlawful arrest, and not to make such resistance a new
substantive crime. '0 7
The court concluded that:
"... if section 834a [the new provision], by eliminating the
remedy of self-help, facilitates or sanctions arrests which are
by definition unlawful, it could be urged with considerable
persuasion that the defendant's constitutional rights would
be violated by the statute."-"
These objections are made to the general scheme of statutes
abolishing the right to resist an unlawful arrest. More specific
faults should be mentioned. For instance, if the Law Institute
proposals had passed, subsection "d" of La. R.S. 14:108 would
have made "congregating with others on a public street and re-
fusing to move on when ordered to do so by an officer" a crime
even when the order to move on was unlawful and unautho-
rized.&9 In Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham4o the United States Su-
preme Court called a similar provision "government by the
moment-to-moment opinions of a policeman on his beat," 41 and
therefore constitutionally impermissible. As for criminal convic-
tion for refusing to heed a policeman's unlawful orders, the
Supreme Court has said:
36. Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 960 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
37. People v. Curtis, 70 Cal.2d 347, 354-55, 450 P.2d 33, 37, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713,
717 (1969).
38. Id. at 353, 450 P.2d at 36, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
39. See note 37 supra.
40. 382 U.S. 87 (1965).
41. Id. at 90.
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"Obviously, however, one cannot be punished for failing
to obey the command of an officer if that command is itself
violative of the Constitution."
42
Conclusion
In conclusion, no one should ever be counseled to resist an
arrest. The possible danger to the person should always be con-
sidered, and the civil damages recoverable should be weighed
against the inconvenience and indignity of the illegal arrest.
However, although there is yet no direct jurisprudence on the
issue of the existence of a constitutional right to resist an un-
lawful arrest, this writer firmly believes that such a right is
necessarily implicit in both the Fourth Amendment and in the
concept of due process of law. To those who believe that resistance
to any arrest has the disasterous effect of condoning disrespect
for law and proper legal authority, it should be emphasized:
"The purpose of the right is not to encourage violent attacks
on policemen, but to preserve the sense of personal liberty
inherent in the right to reject arbitrary orders. To permit
the police to provoke individuals into committing the crime
of resisting arrest, creates a trap for citizens which must, in
the long run, injure the integrity of the legal system.' '48
Allan L. Durand
USE OF DEADLY FORCE IN THE ARREST PROCESS
In recent years, police officers and police departments have
been recipients of an ever-increasing barrage of accusations and
denunciations concerning alleged police brutality. This fact is
especially true with regard to the use of deadly force in effecting
arrests. Positions, both pro and con, have been supported with
equal vehemence, leaving the individual police forces, to a large
degree, occupying a rather undesirable middle-ground between
the extremes. A large portion of the difficulty in this area has
stemmed from confusion and misconception, on the part of both
police officers and society, as to the exact extent of an officer's
42. Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 291-92 (1962).
43. Chevigny, The Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest, 78 YALE L. J. 1128,
1150 (1969).
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